Phone: 519-661-2111, Ext. 84638
Office: Stevenson Hall, Room 4145
My areas of research are within the Philosophy of Language. I'm primarily interested on foundational questions about reference, about what makes it the case that words stand for things. I have worked on the semantics of singular and general terms. More recently I have discussed proposals by experimental semanticists.
I would be happy to supervise a dissertation on any issue in Philosophy of Language but in particular within the theory of reference and experimental semantics.
Some recent publications
“General Terms, Rigidity and the Trivialization Problem,” with José Martínez-Fernández. Synthese 181, 2 (2011), pp. 277-293; doi:10.1007/s11229-010-9802-7.
“Reference and Experimental Semantics.” Edouard Machery and Elizabeth O’Neill (eds.): Current Controversies in Experimental Philosophy. New York. Routledge (2014), pp. 17-26.
“Reference without Cognition.” Andrea Bianchi (ed.): Reference. Oxford University Press (2015).