David Bourget


Associate Professor
Director, Centre for Digital Philosophy

Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy of Language
BSc Laval; PhD ANU

Office: Stevenson Hall 3142
E-mail: dbourget@uwo.ca
Website: dbourget.com

I have two main research interests: consciousness and computing in philosophy. The main aim of my work on consciousness is to characterize its general features (for example, is it a kind of propositional representation?) with a view to facilitating a scientific explanation. My computing-related work mainly focuses on PhilPapers.org and related services that I maintain and develop at the Centre for Digital Philosophy. These days I am particularly interested in developing new types of services and investigating new forms of computing-centric inquiries that can help us better understand philosophical debates. 

I am happy to supervise graduate students working on consciousness or digital philosophy. The Centre for Digital Philosophy has independent funding to help students in the latter area.

Recent Publications


"Consciousness and Intentionality"(with A. Mendelovici). In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Consciousness. New York, USA: Oxford University Press. pp. 560-585 (2020).

"Anomalous Dualism: A New Approach to the Mind-Body Problem". In William Seager (ed.), The Handbook of Panpsychism. Routledge (2019).

"Relational vs Adverbial Conceptions of Phenomenal Intentionality". In Arthur Sullivan (ed.), Sensations, Thoughts, Language: Essays in honor of Brian Loar. Routledge. pp. 137-166 (2019).

"Implications of Intensional Perceptual Ascriptions for Relationalism, Disjunctivism, and Representationalism About Perceptual Experience". In Erkenntnis 84 (2), 2019:381-408.

"The Rational Role of Experience". In Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 61 (5-6), 2018:467-493.

"The Role of Consciousness in Grasping and Understanding". In Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 95 (2), 2017:285-318.

"Why Are Some Phenomenal Experiences 'Vivid' and Others 'Faint'? Representationalism, Imagery, and Cognitive Phenomenology". In Australasian Journal of Philosophy95 (4), 2017:673-687.

"Intensional Perceptual Ascriptions". Erkenntnis 82 (3), 2017:513-530.