Angela Mendelovici


Assistant Professor
Member, Rotman Institute of Philosophy

Philosophy of Mind, Cognitive Science
BA McGill; PhD Princeton

Phone: 519-661-2111 ext. 81583
Office: Stevenson Hall, Room 4135

My research is on intentionality, consciousness, and the relationship between the two. Much of my work argues for the view that intentionality is grounded in phenomenal consciousness.

I am happy to supervise and advise graduate students working in contemporary philosophy of mind, especially those working on intentionality.

Recent Publications

The Phenomenal Basis of Intentionality. Oxford University Press. Forthcoming.

Panpsychisms' combination problem is a problem for everyone. In William Seager, ed., The Routledge Handbook of Panpsychism. Forthcoming.

Mendelovici, A. Olfactory experience, content, and justification. In Berit Brogaard and Dimitria Gatzia (eds.). The Rational Roles of Perceptual Experience: Beyond Vision. Oxford University Press. (forthcoming)

Mendelovici, A. and Bourget, D. Consciousness and intentionality. In Uriah Kriegel (ed.). Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Consciousness. Oxford University Press. (forthcoming)

Mendelovici, A. Propositionalism without propositions, objectualism without objects. In Alex Grzankowski and Michelle Montague (eds.). Non-propositional Intentionality. Oxford University Press. (forthcoming)

Bourget, D. and Mendelovici, A. Phenomenal intentionality. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. (2016)

Why tracking theories should allow for clean cases of reliable misrepresentation. Disputatio. 8 (42):57–92. (2016)