Member, Rotman Institute of Philosophy
Philosophy of Mind, Language, and Cognitive Science
BA McGill; PhD Princeton
My research is on intentionality, consciousness, and the relationship between the two. Much of my work argues for the view that intentionality is grounded in phenomenal consciousness.
I am happy to supervise and advise graduate students working in contemporary philosophy of mind, especially those working on intentionality.
Some recent publications
Mendelovici, A. (2013). Reliable misrepresentation and tracking theories of mental representation. Philosophical Studies 165 (2):421-443.
Mendelovici, A. (2013). Intentionalism about moods. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 2 (1):126-136.
Mendelovici, A., and Bourget, D. (2014). Naturalizing intentionality: Tracking theories versus phenomenal intentionality theories. Philosophy Compass 9 (5):325-337. 2014.